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1 The Nature of Punishment: Reply to Wringe
David Boonin and I have independently argued that many justifications of legal punishment
fail. Our arguments rely partly on the claim that an agent punishes a subject only if the agent
aims to harm the subject. Call this the Aim to Harm Requirement or AHR for short. Boonin
says that it’s Balmost universally accepted^ in the punishment literature (Boonin 2008: 13-14,
n14; cf. Hanna 2008: 126, 2009: 330: 593). And we’ve both argued for it at length even
though few philosophers object to it in print (Boonin 2008: 6-21; Hanna 2008: 125-8, 2009:
329-31). Here, I’ll consider the arguments of one of the few who has.
Wringe (2013) defends his preferred justification of legal punishment against our criticisms
by arguing that AHR is false.1,2 His arguments are original. And like-minded philosophers
have endorsed them (e.g., Glasgow 2015: 612, n28; Lee 2017). In this paper, I’ll show that
Wringe’s arguments against AHR fail. By my count he gives two such arguments. The first
attacks AHR directly. The second attacks certain arguments for it.
2 Argument One: Against AHR
Wringe’s first argument cites a popular account of legal punishment and tries to show that a
plausible reading of it is consistent with denying AHR. He credits the account to H.L.A. Hart and
puts it like this: legal punishment Binvolv[es] harsh treatment [and is] inflicted on an offender by
an appropriate authority, in response to … wrongdoing^ (863, citing Hart 1968: 4-5). Wringe
takes the reference to harsh treatment here to be especially important and tries to clarify what it
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1All references are to Wringe (2013) unless otherwise noted. Wringe (2016: 18-41) reiterates the arguments.
2Another objection to our arguments grants AHR and says that the aim to harm doesn’t have the moral
significance that we take it to have. We both address this objection (Boonin 2008: 15-16, 28-29, 61-2, 234;
Hanna 2008: 333, 2014: 595-7). Wringe seems to press a version of it at one point, but he doesn’t consider our
replies (868-9). I give a novel reply in Hanna (ms).
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means. An obvious interpretation takes harsh treatment to be harmful treatment. But Wringe says
that there’s another interpretation: on his view, harsh treatment is Btreatment which would
normally be found burdensome by a typical individual of the kind on whom it is being imposed^
(867).3 He notes that this characterization has an interesting implication: because treatment that’s
only normally harmful can fail to harm, we can treat someone harshly without harming her or
aiming to. In light of this,Wringe concludes that a plausible reading of Hart’s account is consistent
with the claim that we can punish someone without harming her or aiming to. On this reading, an
alternative to AHR is true: an agent doesn’t have to aim to harm a subject to punish the subject; the
agent just has to aim to treat the subject harshly in Wringe’s sense (868).4
There are two problems with this argument. First, Wringe misstates Hart’s account. Hart
doesn’t say that legal punishment involves harsh treatment. What he says is that legal
punishment Bmust involve pain or other consequences normally considered unpleasant^ (Hart
1968: 4). Later, he just says that legal punishment is Bpainful^ and that it Bentails suffering^
(ibid.: 6, 26).5 These claims are inconsistent with the claim that legal punishment can be
harmless.6 Since Wringe misstates Hart’s account, he hasn’t shown that a plausible reading of
it is consistent with denying AHR. That said, his take on Hart’s account might be indepen-
dently plausible even if it’s not what Hart had in mind. This brings me to the second problem
with Wringe’s argument: there are good reasons to reject his take on Hart’s account.
Recall, Wringe’s take on Hart’s account says that legal punishment Binvolv[es] harsh treatment
[and is] inflicted on an offender by an appropriate authority, in response to…wrongdoing.^Wringe
says that harsh treatment can sometimes be harmless because it only has to be normally harmful.
And his alternative toAHRdeniesAHR and says that an agentmust aim to treat a subject harshly in
order to punish. This account has false implications. Consider:
Judgment: Judge must sentence Thief, but doesn’t want to harm him. Giving him an
obviously harmless sentence will anger the public, though. To avoid this, she gives him a
sentence that would harm the vast majority of people but that – for reasons known only
3 Wringe shifts between talk of burdensome treatment, harmful treatment, and treatment that causes suffering. He
also shifts between talk of aims and intentions. He uses these terms interchangeably. I’ll put my claims in terms of
the aim to harm. I’ll preserve Wringe’s wording when quoting him and use mine when paraphrasing.
4 Much of the rest of his paper defends three claims. One: the distinction between aiming to harm a subject and
aiming to treat the subject harshly is a genuine distinction (867-8). Two: a harshness based account of legal
punishment can accommodate our intuitions about cases (869-73). Three: his preferred Bdenunciatory^ account
of legal punishment is consistent with his alternative to AHR (873-4). I’ll focus on the second claim. I’ll argue
that there are counterexamples to harshness based accounts and that they don’t accommodate important intuitions
about cases.
5 As I read Hart, he’s saying that punishment must be bad for its victim (harmful) and that being painful is the
most obvious way it can be so. He credits the account to Benn and Flew, who are more explicit about this. Flew
says that punishment must be an Bevil, an unpleasantness, to the victim^ and that it needn’t be painful (1954:
293). Benn says that it must Binvolve^ such an evil (1958: 325). More recently, Boonin gives good reasons to
characterize punishment in terms of harm rather than pain and suffering (2008: 6-7). That said, pain and suffering
are salient harms that punishment is often meant to inflict. So it’s understandable why Hart characterizes
punishment in these terms (cf. Hanna 2008: 126).
6 Hart says that punishment involves pain or unpleasantness. A referee suggested that this is consistent with
Wringe’s alternative to AHR because the alternative captures a way that punishment can be said to involve such
things. I don’t think that this is a plausible reading of Hart. It’s inconsistent with his later, more straightforward
characterizations of punishment. And it takes his criterion to be stating a merely typical feature of legal
punishment rather than a necessary one. Hart seems to intend his criterion in the latter way (his ensuing
discussion of non-legal punishments suggests this). I think that his use of the word involves is just meant to
leave open the nature of the relationship between this criterion and his other criteria. There’s no indication that it’s
meant to leave open the possibility that punishment can be harmless.
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to the two of them – won’t harm him. This will avoid public anger because people will
just assume that the sentence harms him.
This sentence satisfies the above criteria. It’s imposed on an offender by an appropriate
authority in response to wrongdoing. It’s harsh in Wringe’s sense, since it would harm the
vast majority of people. And the authority aims to treat the offender harshly in Wringe’s sense.
So the account entails that the sentence is a punishment.7 But it’s not. It’s just meant to look
like a punishment. So the account is false. And AHR plausibly explains where the account
goes wrong: Judge doesn’t punish Thief because she doesn’t aim to harm him.
Wringe might object that Judgment is too abstract and that a concrete version of it wouldn’t
obviously involveaharmless sentence.Thebestway todealwith thisworry is tomake thecasemore
concrete.But thebestway todo that dependson the right theoryofharm.Since I can’t defend sucha
theory here, I’ll just give amore concrete versionof the case in linewithwhat I take to be a plausible
theory.8Suppose then thatThief lovesdoingcommunity service.Hedoesn’t find it at all unpleasant.
Andifhe’sable,he’lldolotsof it afterhe’ssentenced.Judgeknowsallof thisandsentenceshimtodo
the very kind of community service that he was planning to do. Thief eagerly does evenmore than
he’s required to do, greatly enjoys it, and doesn’t find it at all unpleasant. Tome at least, it’s obvious
that Thief isn’t harmed and that Judge doesn’t punish him. I suspect that manywould agree.9
There’s another way that Wringe might try to resist my counterexample, though. He might
try to further clarify the nature of harshness in an attempt to show that Judge doesn’t really treat
Thief harshly (cf. 874-6). If she doesn’t, then Wringe’s take on Hart’s account won’t entail that
she punishes Thief. Recall, Wringe says that harsh treatment is Btreatment which would
normally be found burdensome by a typical individual of the kind on whom it is being
imposed.^ Here are two representative versions of the reply.
& Whether Judge treats Thief harshly depends on her psychology. She aims not to harm him
and imposes a sentence that she knows won’t harm him. Treating people like that is never
harmful. So it’s not normally harmful. So it’s not harsh.
& Whether Judge treats Thief harshly depends on facts about Thief. A typical individual like
him would have the personal characteristics that make the sentence harmless to him. So
treating him in this way isn’t normally harmful. So it’s not harsh.
These replies characterize harsh treatment in ways that are designed to evade my counter-
example. But they don’t explain why their characterizations are good ones. So they’re ad hoc.
7 Wringe’s preferred denunciatory account of legal punishment says that an act is a legal punishment only if it’s
meant to publicly denounce wrongdoing. I’ll discuss this claim later. For now, just notice that it poses no problem
here. We can stipulate that Judge imposes the sentence to (insincerely?) denounce Thief’s thievery in a non-
harmful way. And we can stipulate that being denounced in this way doesn’t harm Thief, e.g., because he finds
the attention paid to his daring thefts enjoyable and in no way unpleasant.
8 I defend my preferred theory in Hanna (2016). It’s not clear what theory Wringe accepts. But he seems to
endorse some odd claims about harm. He suggests that a subject who genuinely believes that imprisonment can’t
harm her wouldn’t be harmed by being imprisoned (867). No mainstream theory of harm makes harm belief-
sensitive in this way. For a critical overview of theories see Bradley (2012).
9 A referee objected that the sentence might still be a punishment because being sentenced to do community
service has a certain Bsocial meaning.^ In reply, Judgment seems to show that a token sentence can share the
social meaning that sentences of its type typically have without being a punishment. To put this point in terms of
the particular meaning that Wringe is concerned with, a token sentence can serve to publicly denounce an
offender’s conduct without being a punishment. Judge’s sentence may have such a meaning only because the
public is mistaken about the details of the case.
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If Wringe wants to resist my counterexample by clarifying the nature of harshness, he must
give a principled account of harshness that can figure in a plausible account of punishment.
But there’s a good reason to think that this can’t be done: there doesn’t seem to be a necessary
connection between how a form of treatment would normally affect people and whether a
particular instance of it is a punishment. Consider: it seems possible to determine whether an
agent’s treatment of a subject is a punishment just by considering facts about the agent and the
subject such as the agent’s motives and the effects of the treatment on the subject. And it seems
that the treatment can be a punishment even if the subject is unique and no other subject would
be harmed by being treated so treated. Wringe doesn’t give any good reasons to deny these
claims. So his alternative to AHR seems unmotivated.
You might disagree. You might think that there are good motivations for Wringe’s
alternative. Two facts in particular might look like good reasons to accept it. The first is
that state officials typically punish offenders by using standard sentences that would
harm most people. This isn’t a good reason to accept Wringe’s alternative, though
because AHR is consistent with this fact and can help to explain it. State officials do
this because it’s an efficient and sufficiently reliable way to harm offenders, given
limited time and resources.
Another fact that might look like a good reason to accept Wringe’s alternative is this: his
alternative entails that the arguments that Boonin and I give against legal punishment fail. This
is because our arguments rely on AHR. Wringe himself says that this is a good reason to accept
his alternative even if it has counterintuitive implications. Specifically, he says that the claim
that we can legally punish without harming or aiming to harm might seem counterintuitive,
especially to those of us who find an analogous claim about non-legal punishment counterin-
tuitive. But he insists that accepting these implications is worth being able to reject the
arguments that Boonin and I give. Here’s how Wringe puts this point.
What is true of the state [on Wringe’s alternative] might not be true of other kinds of
individuals or institutions… such as parents, schools, or religious communities. This will
strike some… as a problem, insofar as they favor an account of what punishment is that
applies to both state and non-state punishments. However, I do not think that allowing for
a slight difference in what we take punishment to be is especially counter-intuitive here,
particularly when weighed against the benefits of having an account of state punishment
which escapes Hanna’s [and Boonin’s] objections. (875, n26)
The purported benefit here isn’t a good reason to accept Wringe’s alternative. Treating it that
way violates a plausible criterion for a good account of legal punishment: that the account be
neutral about whether and why legal punishment is morally justified.10 Wringe doesn’t give
any good reason to reject this criterion. So this motivation for his alternative is a bad one.
I conclude that Wringe’s first argument against AHR fails. His harshness based take on Hart’s
account is false and his alternative to AHR is unmotivated. I’ll discuss his second argument in a
moment. But first I want to briefly discuss two objections toAHR that he doesn’t make.11 The first
says that AHR is false because institutions of punishment can be structured so that officials can
punish without aiming to harm. To illustrate, suppose that a judge is legally required to impose a
mandatory minimum prison sentence on a convicted defendant and that she does so only because
she’s legally required to, not because she aims to harm him. AHR entails that she doesn’t punish
10 See Bedau and Kelly (2015: Sec. 2), Boonin (2008: 5-6), and Zimmerman (2011: 1-2).
11 Thanks to two referees for raising these objections.
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him, but youmight think that she does. The second objection says that AHR has false implications
in a variant of Judgment. Suppose that Judge’s sentence harms Thief despite her aim not to harm
him. AHR entails that she doesn’t punish him. But you might think that she does.
These are challenging objections. They show that AHR’s advocates have to think more
carefully about the nature of punishment in complex institutional contexts. I’m optimistic that
the objections can be overcome, but I won’t try to do that here. I’m just trying to show that
Wringe’s attack on AHR fails. Since he doesn’t raise these objections, I won’t try to defend
AHR against them.12
This might seem evasive, though. You might think that Wringe’s alternative to AHR avoids
such objections and that this gives it a clear advantage over AHR.13 Not so.Wringe’s alternative is
vulnerable to similar objections. Consider: a judge can inadvertently impose a harsh sentence
while aiming not to. And it’s possible for a judge to impose a legally mandated sentence without
aiming to treat an offender harshly. You might think that judges who act in these ways are still
punishing. ButWringe’s alternative entails that they’re not. The failure to realize this stems from a
misunderstanding of his alternative. Recall, his alternative says that an agent punishes a subject
only if the agent aims to treat the subject harshly. Wringe explicitly says that an agent doesn’t do
this just by aiming to treat the subject in a way that happens to be harsh. To satisfy the criterion,
Wringe says, the agent must treat the subject in that way because it’s harsh (868). In other words,
the harshness of the treatment must be among the agent’s reasons for imposing it.14 So Wringe’s
alternative is no better off here.
Now I’ll consider Wringe’s second argument against AHR.
3 Argument Two: Against Arguments for AHR
Wringe’s second argument against AHR attacks one of my arguments for it. Here’s how
Wringe puts my argument.
Hanna argues that the existence of cases of burdensome treatment which are not
punishment, such as quarantine and involuntary detainment of the mentally ill, shows
that [punishment must involve] an intention to cause suffering. Quarantine and the
involuntary hospitalization of the mentally ill are not punishment because they do not
involve an intention to cause suffering. (869, citing Hanna 2008: 127-8)
Wringe says that there are two ways to reject this argument. One: say that some treatment is a
legal punishment only if it’s a response to wrongdoing (869-70). Two: say that some treatment
is a legal punishment only if it’s meant to denounce wrongdoing in a sense spelled out by his
Bdenunciatory^ account of legal punishment (870, n14). That account says that Bthe purpose of
the harsh treatment that [legal] punishment involves is for a society to communicate to its
members that certain [moral] norms are in force and that transgressions against them are
viewed seriously^ (865, 873). Things like quarantine and involuntary psychiatric commitment
12 Michael Zimmerman offers one plausible reply to such worries (2011: 19-21). He says that AHR is true only
for agents who act on their own behalf and that a variant of it is true for agents who act on behalf of others like the
state. According to this variant, an agent who doesn’t aim to harm a subject can still punish the subject by acting
on behalf of someone else who aims to harm the subject. I’m inclined to take a harder line against the above
objections and say that AHR s true for everyone. But I won’t give my preferred reply here.
13 Thanks to a referee for raising this worry.
14 I frame AHR in such terms in Hanna (ms).
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typically don’t satisfy these criteria. So the criteria entail that they’re typically not legal
punishments.
There are two problemswith this argument. First,Wringemisstates the argument that he’s citing.
In the passage that he cites, he takes me to be arguing that AHR is true because it counts the above
forms of treatment as non-punitive. But that’s not what I says in the cited passage. Here’s what I say.
The claim that the aim to impose suffering is essential to punishment has a certain
intuitive appeal, but there are other considerations that speak in its favor. The aim
invariably influences the way that punishments are applied and so helps to account for
significant differences between punitive and non-punitive treatment, e.g., differences
between [punitive] imprisonment and other kinds of confinement. Medical quarantine,
involuntary psychiatric commitment and protective confinement all cause suffering.
Ideally, however, steps are taken to minimize the suffering they cause. This is not the
case with [punitive] imprisonment. Offenders are imprisoned, at least in part, in order to
make them suffer and prison conditions are designed in service to this aim. (Hanna
2008: 126; Hanna says that by suffering he means hurt or harm)
In this passage, I argue for AHR by appealing to its explanatory value: it explains some typical
differences between some punitive and non-punitive forms of confinement. Wringe’s wrongdoing
and denunciation criteria don’t do this. The former doesn’t because it doesn’t say how legal
punishment responds to wrongdoing. The latter doesn’t because it doesn’t explain how legal
punishment denounces wrongdoing. So neither criterion poses a problem for what I actually say
in the above passage. Of course, the conjunction of these criteria withWringe’s alternative to AHR
can in principle do some of this explanatory work. But we’ve seen that there are good reasons to
doubt Wringe’s alternative. So appealing to it isn’t a good way to do that work.
That said, the explanatory argument isn’t the only one that I give. Elsewhere, I do argue for AHR
by saying that it correctly classifies certain forms of treatment as non-punitive. But a crucial part of
that argument says that accounts of punishment that try to do this while denying claims like AHR
have false implications (Hanna 2009: 330-31). The second problem with Wringe’s argument is that
the wrongness and denunciation criteria have such implications. Consider:
Bombed: Comic is performing a stand-up comedy routine for King, a mercurial
monarch with absolute legal authority. King’s unpredictability makes her nervous. As
a result, her timing is off and her jokes aren’t funny. King is displeased by this. He
sentences her to a week in the royal dungeon for not being funny. But he doesn’t think
that she has done anything morally wrong and isn’t morally denouncing her actions.
King punishes Comic. There’s nothing odd about this. Punishing someone without thinking
that her actions were wrong and without morally denouncing her actions is surely possible. To
take just two examples, a dog owner can do this to her dog for peeing inside and a piano
teacher can do this to a new student for a slip of the fingers – say with a rap on the nose and the
knuckles, respectively. Moreover, King legally punishes Comic because he exercises his legal
authority in doing so. Wringe’s criteria entail that King doesn’t legally punish Comice. So
Wringe’s criteria are false.15
15 I’d say the same about a weaker version of the wrongdoing criterion, e.g.: an act is a legal punishment only if
it’s a response to a legal offense. Bombed is also a counterexample to this claim because Comic doesn’t commit a
legal offense (cf. Zimmerman 2011: 14). That said, a weaker version of the disapproval criterion might be true.
Maybe all punishments express disapproval. Even if such a criterion is true, though, it doesn’t seem helpful to
Wringe. Such a criterion can’t obviously do all of the explanatory and conceptual work that AHR does.
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It’s worth noting that other mainstream accounts of legal punishment eschew these criteria,
presumably for similar reasons. To take a few examples, Boonin’s account says that legal
punishment is a response to a legal offense and that it expresses disapproval (2008: 6-26). He
puts neither condition in moral terms. Hart’s account also includes a legal offense condition,
but has no disapproval condition (Hart 1968: 4-5; cf. Benn 1958: 325, Flew: 1954: 293). Even
Feinberg’s account – a forerunner of Wringe’s denunciatory account – doesn’t obviously
require that the disapproval be moral. Feinberg says:
It is much easier to show that punishment has a symbolic significance than to say exactly
what it is that punishment expresses. At its best, in civilized and democratic societies,
punishment … expresses the judgment … of the community that what the criminal did
was wrong.^ (1965: 402-3, emphasis added)
Given all this, I see no reason to accept the wrongdoing and denunciation criteria. And I see no
reason to think that appealing to them instead of AHR is a good way to do the relevant
explanatory and conceptual work.
Wringe might reply that I’ve misunderstood the wrongdoing and denunciation criteria. He
might say that they’re not meant as constraints on what legal punishment is, but as constraints
on what morally justified legal punishment is and that I’ve given no good reasons to reject
them, so understood.16 This reply might seem plausible, especially since Hart says something
similar about his own account (Hart 1968: 5-6).17 But the reply fails. So understood, Wringe’s
criteria are consistent with AHR and with many arguments for it. This is because AHR is a
view about what punishment is, not a view about what morally justified punishment is. If we
understand Wringe’s criteria in the proposed way, they’re just irrelevant to the present debate
about AHR.
Given these problems, I conclude that Wringe’s second argument against AHR also fails.
Neither of his arguments give us any good reasons to doubt AHR.18
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